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Abstract: In the period 1861–1918, thirty-three commons were established in 
Northern Sweden. This was linked to the finalisation of the Great Redistribution 
of Forest Holdings in Dalarna and the delimitation process in Västerbotten and 
Norrbotten. They were intended to serve as an instrument for improved and 
sustained forest production, the viability of farmers and the liveability of the rural 
communities in the areas where they were established. The aim of this paper is 
to describe the results of a study examining how three of these forest commons, 
one from each region, have benefitted the local shareholders and their community. 
The perceptions among forest common shareholders were assessed using a 
questionnaire. The study also assessed economic impact on shareholders in terms 
of extent and use of the dividend from each of the commons for the period 1958–
2007, highlighting the extent of the economic support to individual shareholders 
and to the local community. Results reveal large differences between the three 
cases; there was a positive correlation between the extent of the economic support 
and contentment among the shareholders.
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1. Introduction
In the literature, commons are traditionally described as resources where usage 
rights are shared according to set principles, often covered by legislation, and 
among a defined group of members; however, due to the subtractability of the 
resource and the difficulty (or high cost) of exclusion, commons are considered 
a separate class of goods, different from pure public goods or the club goods 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995; McKean 1998). Furthermore, studies of common-pool 
resources in numerous settings, particularly of those that have survived for a long 
period, have shown that commons can perform as well as or even better than 
public and private resource management institutions under certain conditions, 
which have been promulgated as the “design principles” for successful commons 
(Ostrom 1990; McKean 1992, 1998; Becker and Ostrom 1995). Box 1 lists the 
attributes associated with the successful common property regimes, which also 
correspond to the “design principles” (Ostrom 1990; McKean 1998). One of the 
key characteristics of a successful/successfully-governed common is considered 
to be the equity or perceived fairness in sharing of the benefits and the costs 
within its members/shareholders (Ostrom 1990; McKean 1998). In many of these 
successful commons studied, sharing of the benefits and costs were linked to the 
size of the shareholding or on the private asset holding of the household (McKean 
1992, 1998), as is also the case in the Swedish forest commons (Carlsson 1997). 
Moreover, as McKean (1998) points out ‘distribution of decision-making rights 
and use rights to co-owners of the commons need not be egalitarian but must 
be viewed as “fair” (one in which the ratio of individual benefit to individual 
cost falls within a range they see as acceptable)’ for a common to be successful. 
However, previous studies on the Swedish forest commons have not only pointed 
out the diminishing role of the shareholders in terms of governance/management 
(i.e. decision-making rights) of their commons (Stenman 2009; Holmgren et al. 
2010), but they have also pointed to the fact that the shareholders in Swedish 
forest commons do not bear costs proportional to the benefits they obtain 
(Carlsson 1997). In this context, it is therefore relevant to evaluate the outcomes 
that members perceive, as well as the extent to which commons may contribute to 
not just their own welfare but that of the people who are not part of the commons, 
for example, by supporting public goods (cf. Short 2008). For instance, Short 
notes that common land in the UK has recently come to be “prized for its public 
good functions, a relatively new concept for commons generally and one with a 
different economic meaning” (Short 2008, 207). In addition, he notes, “commons 
are increasingly important to a number of ‘new’ rural objectives and that the 
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associated policy developments may hold an important message for sustainable 
multifunctional land management more generally” (Short 2008, 193).
However, the Swedish concept of Forest Commons (FCs) has largely been 
institutionalised by the state to provide goods and services not only to FC 
members but also to the public. FCs in Sweden are thus more akin to community-
based enterprises in that they are based on utilitarian economic models but have 
social goals (cf. Berkes and Davidson-Hunt 2010) and can be compared to the 
land management by village corporations e.g. in Alaska (Dayo and Kofinas 2010), 
although the bylaws covering Swedish FC were, in some cases, established more 
than 150 years ago. The Swedish FC originated from shares in the ownership of 
private forests, providing a resource managed in common and thereby contributing 
to social goods rather than representing only individual goods.
There are 23.6 million ha of forest in Sweden, of which 50% is owned by some 
336 000 non-industrial private forest (NIPF) owners (Anon 2008). Twenty-five 
thousands of these owners are also shareholders in one of the 33 FCs, established 
in the period 1861–1918 in the interior of northern Sweden (Holmgren 2006). 
These FCs cover 537 000 ha of productive forestland of which 410 000 ha belong 
to NIPF owners. Forest owners hold shares in the commons, and these can 
only be transferred together with the private estates to which the shareholding 
is tied. The shareholder rights, including the right to hunt and fish in the FC, 
are retained even after the shareholder has moved away from the community 
(Allmänningsutredningen 1983). In each FC, a board elected by the shareholders 
manage (make decisions regarding) the forests with support from a professional 
forester. Indeed the FCs are required to employ professional foresters for the actual 
work, and they execute the agreed actions regarding the forests. Shareholders’ 
voting rights with respect to management of the FCs are, in general, proportional 
to the size of their shareholdings, although some FCs have introduced by-laws 
designed to limit the dominance of the larger landowners.
At their establishment, the Swedish FCs were supposed to meet a number of 
objectives – these, along with the means of achieving them have been discussed by 
Box 1: Attributes of successful common property regimes (adapted from McKean 1998). These 
also generally correspond to the “design principles” for long surviving commons (Ostrom 
1990)
1. Recognition of the local rights to organise/devise own resource institutions
2. Clearly defined boundaries of the resource
3. Clearly defined membership criteria for use of the resource
4.  Right to modify the use rules over time [corresponds to ‘collective-choice arrangements’ in Ostrom 
(1990)]
5. Congruence between use rules and local (environmental) conditions
6. Clear and easily enforceable use rules
7. Monitoring of the rules and graduated sanctions in case of infractions
8. “Fair” distribution of rights and resources
9. Inexpensive and efficient conflict-resolution mechanisms
10. Nested, but devolved institutions for large resource systems
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Liljenäs (1977, 1982, 1983), the Ministry of Agriculture (Allmänningsutredningen 
1983), Stenman (1983), Kardell (1991, 2004), Carlsson (1995, 1999, 2000, 
2001), Ericsson (1997) and Pettersson (2003), among others. A summary of these 
aims and means is presented in Box 2. No ranking of their importance has been 
attempted, since the aims are closely interconnected.
As shown in Box 1, one reason for establishing the Swedish FCs was to 
improve the quality of life, through forest-related activities, in the local 
communities in which they were established. The means to achieve this were 
by improving the local economy, providing employment, incentives to local 
agriculture and forestry, and supporting the provision of common goods in the 
local community (e.g. social care, a priest and a doctor, and bringing electricity 
to rural areas). The overall intention was to create places where people would 
like to work and live.
Therefore, the interaction between individual (private) benefits to commons’ 
members and to the wider community is relevant in the Swedish case in particular. 
Moreover, we expect there to be differences in shareholders’ perceptions of FC 
contributions, advantages and disadvantages, and that the Swedish FC may 
illustrate the division between a focus on common and on individual aims both 
at the shareholders’ level and at the FC level. More specifically, we expect to find 
shareholders’ perceptions of the benefits linked to the individual benefits they 
derive from the commons, and as such we expect economically successful FCs to 
have a more engaged/participatory shareholder base than those not performing as 
well. This issue has not received much attention in previous studies of the Swedish 
forest commons. Thus, the main purpose of this study is to assess the extent to 
which the Swedish FC, like a community-based enterprise, supports shareholders’ 
private interests and at the same time promotes public goods relevant to the rural 
society. Furthermore, given the nature of their establishment (top-down), we 
assess, using the relevant attributes of successful commons (Ostrom 1990; Becker 
and Ostrom 1995; McKean 1998) and by looking at shareholders’ perceptions as 
Box 2: The aims of the Swedish forest commons and the means intended to achieve them
Aims Means
To serve as an instrument for improved forest •	
management with the focus on increased and 
sustained timber production.
To serve as an instrument for sustainable •	
economic support for farmers and the local 
economy, also to provide a solid basis for taxation 
and to secure the continued existence of an 
independent class of farmers.
To support rural development and well-being.•	
By orderly, planned, scientifically •	
based forest management, facilitated by 
professional foresters, larger production 
units and the exercise of authority.
By serving as a model for the farmers for •	
the management of their own forests.
By providing employment.•	
By preventing forest companies from •	
acquiring the farmers’ forest land.
By providing incentives to local agriculture •	
and forestry.
By supporting local common goods.•	
168 Gun Lidestav et al.
well as actual outcomes in terms of revenues and dividend shared in the past 50 
years, whether the FCs in Sweden can be considered successful.
2. Establishment and development of Älvdalen, Jokkmokk and 
Tärna-Stensele Forest Commons
The FC in Älvdalen was established in 1885 and the Jokkmokk FC in 1889 
(Holmgren 2006). Both of these FCs are composed of a 25% share of each 
farmer’s originally allocated land, amounting to 54 000 ha of productive forest 
land in Älvdalen and 61 120 ha in Jokkmokk (Älvdalen FC homepage 2009; 
Jokkmokk FC homepage 2009). In 1906 the earlier delimitation rules (SFS 1873) 
were changed in the ‘Act Relating to Establishment of Commons by Coercion’ 
(SFS 1906, 36). From then, the official view was that the state was the owner of 
the land to be donated during the delimitation process (Stenman 2009). Hence, 
the state could by-pass earlier delimitation rules concerning the size of allocated 
forest land, making it easier to establish an FC without the landowner’s consent. 
However, the delimitation process was by then almost finished, essentially only 
the inner regions of Västerbotten remained unallocated. Among the remaining 
areas were the western half of Stensele parish and the whole of the adjacent 
Tärna parish. The forest land in Tärna was of insufficient size and of poor quality. 
It was therefore decided to join the Tärna FC with the more fertile forest land 
in Stensele parish. The FC established in 1918 was therefore called the Tärna-
Stensele FC (TSA) and is composed of 45–50% of the farmers’ allocated land, 
in total about 38 400 ha (TSA FC homepage 2009). The joining of the two FCs 
went against the wishes of the shareholders from Stensele (Stenman 2009). 
Furthermore, the shareholders from Tärna were in the majority and, with the 
establishment of the TSA, obtained fishing and hunting rights in Stensele parish. 
In 1971, the two parishes were amalgamated into the municipality of Storuman. 
TSA is 96% owned by NIPF shareholders, of whom 48% are resident. Since the 
resident NIPF owners generally have larger shares in the FC, they own about 
61% of it. This is also the FC, among the three examined, where the number of 
shareholders has increased the most, from 449 in 1923 to 1300 in 2008.
At the time of its establishment, there were 1199 shareholders in the Älvdalen 
FC, a number that has today increased by 55% to 1857. The number of shareholders 
has been higher, but, through a project called “voluntarily exchange of land” 
(“frivilligt markbyte”), shareholders have been helped by the FC to find solutions 
to issues concerning multiple and/or unclear ownership, and to exchange land. 
The aims of the project have been to improve the layout of the land and to increase 
productivity. According to the shareholder register, 824 (44%) shareholders were 
resident at the time of our study.
The number of shareholders in the Jokkmokk FC is currently 896. The largest 
owner is the forest company SCA, which is not a NIPF and owns more than 
50% of the shares. The municipality of Jokkmokk has experienced a decline in 
population of 53% over the last 50 years and today about 454 NIPF shareholders 
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(who own 29% of the FC) are resident within the municipality. In total, NIPF 
shareholders own 45% of the FC. Even though SCA is a majority owner, it only 
has one representative on the board and its dividend is limited to 25% of the 
general forest subsidy. This results in a proportionally larger share of the dividend 
for the NIPF shareholders.
3. Study areas and research methods
The forest commons selected for this study: Älvdalen in Dalarna, Jokkmokk in 
Norrbotten, and Tärna-Stensele in Västerbotten, are three of the major forest 
commons in Sweden. The selection was based on their relative similarities 
(in size and geographical position as foothill forest with relatively low site 
productivity of about 2.5–3.8 m3/ha/year within their regions) as well as their 
relative differences (time of establishment, the principles for distribution of the 
dividend, and the differing share of NIPF-ownership). The government regulates 
the FCs more strictly than the individually owned and managed NIPFs (Holmgren 
et al. 2010), although there are regional differences in the level of government 
involvement. For example, Västerbotten has been considered the most restrictive 
and Dalarna (previously Kopparberg) the least (ibid). Besides the national 
legislation, each FC also has its own specific by-laws. These are authorized by 
the County Administration, which regulates the direct management of the FCs 
(Carlsson 1995). Another important difference between the regions concerns 
the stipulations and practices developed in relation to the use and distribution of 
the dividend (in Swedish, “utdelning”) from the commons. The dividend should 
here be understood as being the part of the annual profit (before taxation) that is 
distributed to the shareholders or to common goods. The FCs, in general, practice 
a supportive subsidy system whereby profits and subsidies are distributed to 
the shareholders on the basis of investment in and management of the estates 
connected to the FC shareholding.
Here, subsidies are given mainly for local agriculture (e.g. veterinary 
costs and milking machines) or forestry (e.g. seedlings, management plans), 
and also to local public bodies (e.g. for roads, schools, sports and cultural 
activities) (SFS 1952; Carlsson 1995). FCs in the county of Västerbotten have 
traditionally been allowed to distribute profits as cash payments to shareholders 
and continue to practice this system. In line with early directives, these payments 
are proportional to shareholder ownership. There has also been a move towards 
this system in Norrbotten, in the form of the general forest subsidy (“förstärkt 
skogsvårdsbidrag”), although this is split equally among shareholders. In both 
cases, the payments are made to all shareholders regardless of their place of 
residence (SFS 1952). In terms of socio-demography, all three municipalities 
are characterized by low population density and out-migration, low educational 
standard and relatively high rate of employment in forestry and agriculture 
(Statistics Sweden 2008).
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As the main focus of this study is on the shareholders’ perceptions regarding the 
individual and common benefits from their forest commons, this study employed 
a short questionnaire survey to obtain information on shareholders’ assessments 
of the contribution of the forest commons to themselves and to their community 
(common benefits), including monetary contributions. The questionnaire survey 
sought to elicit actual/stated benefits (and costs) as well as perceived benefits (and 
costs) at individual and community level from the respondents. Thus, perceptions 
of support as well as the extent of economic and other benefits and costs are 
assessed for the three forest commons studied. In addition, we compare the 
amount of the dividend from each FC, and its distribution, over the last 50 years 
to add to our analyses of the survey results. The value, distribution and use of 
the dividends were assessed on the basis of the individual FC management plans 
and reports for the period 1958–2007. It was not possible to obtain the required 
figures from these documents for the period 1958–1967 for Jokkmokk. Instead, 
the data reported here for this period are from Liljenäs (1977). While comparing 
the economic performance between these three FCs, it is important to note the 
differences between the three FCs studied on how they spent their revenue, both 
as subsidies and cash dividend to individual shareholders and on common goods 
and services. However, considering the large differences between Älvdalen, 
Jokkmokk, and TSA, we do not believe this minor shortcoming adversely affects 
the overall picture presented. For the ease of comparison, the values presented in 
the results are given in terms of 2006 prices.
To maintain the local perspective, only resident shareholders in the three 
FCs were included in the study. The shareholders were divided into three strata 
based on the size of their individual share in each of the FC: the 25% largest 
shareholdings, the 50% intermediate, and the 25% smallest shareholdings. Each 
stratum was further split into female and male shareholders. Thus, shareholders 
for each common were divided into six strata. The purpose of stratification was to 
make sure that the number of large shareholders and women would be large enough 
to perform further analysis of the impact of holding size and gender, however 
not within the scope of this article. Each group was limited to a sample of 50 
individuals, selected by uniform random sampling. As some of the groups turned 
out to contain fewer than 50 shareholders, every individual belonging to the group 
was chosen. This was also taken into account in the statistical calculations. In 
total, 862 questionnaires were sent out in March 2009. After two reminders, 423 
questionnaires were returned and the results are thus based on a total response rate 
of 49%. At the stratum level the response rate varied substantially, from 23% to 
65%, and at the FC level from 44% in Jokkmokk to 53% in Älvdalen. The response 
rate for women was 48% compared to 50% for men. Although the response rate 
may be considered low, it should be noted that the responses represent 22% of the 
actual population.
The data from the questionnaire survey were first entered, verified and coded 
on a spreadsheet. In line with the stated research objectives, the shareholder 
responses regarding various aspects of management and benefits sharing from 
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their FCs were then analysed and, more importantly, compared across the three 
FCs. We primarily use cross tabulation of the responses (counts) with FCs as the 
grouping variables to compare shareholders’ responses to various aspects of their 
participation and perception of benefits and disadvantages from their FCs. The 
comparison in responses across the FCs and the test of significance (c2) were done 
in STATA 11 (StataCorp 2009).
4. Results
4.1. Stated participation in, and utilisation of the FC
About 19–43% stated participation in meetings, with the highest proportion of 
participants in Jokkmokk and the lowest in TSA, with statistically significant 
difference between the FCs overall (Table 1). Between 9 and 32% participate in 
excursions, courses and the like (the most in Älvdalen, the fewest in TSA, with 
an overall significant difference between the FCs). Utilisation of the FC mainly 
took the form of hunting, fishing and outdoors activities, however, the proportion 
of shareholders making use of these services varied significantly between the 
FCs (Table 1). Pairwise comparisons also showed significant differences between 
the three FCs for most of the activities/sources of benefits, however, it was clear 
that Älvdalen and TSA had significantly larger differences than Älvdalen and 
Jokkmokk, and Jokkmokk and TSA. The economic dividend was either a cash 
payment or a grant contribution (depending on regulations of the individual 
FC). The shareholders in Älvdalen (and also to some extent in Jokkmokk) also 
stated indirect benefits from the support to local sporting and other associations, 
roads, schools and public meeting rooms. Very few suggested that they have no 
contact with or benefit from the FC, although a small proportion of uninformed 
respondents exist (indicating that not all shareholders are aware of benefits from 
the FC). Overall, these results suggest that most shareholders receive some benefit 
from the commons, with a smaller portion being active within it, and that the 
benefits range across the scope of individual to public services. Moreover, it is 
important to note that participation in and utilisation of services/benefits from the 
three FCs varied significantly.
4.2. Perceived private and public benefits of the FC
In terms of shareholders’ perceptions regarding the benefits from their FCs, we 
see some significant differences between the three FCs, for both individual and 
common benefits (Tables 2 and 3). A number of perceived individual benefits by 
the shareholders were actually associated with the public goods, particularly in 
Älvdalen. The shareholders in that FC reported investment in roads and other local 
public goods, employment opportunities together with support for management 
of their own properties as the most important outputs of the FC (Table 2). In 
Jokkmokk shareholders stated that support for management of their own property 
and support for hunting, fishing and recreation were the most important benefits 
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from their FC. The latter was also considered most important by TSA shareholders, 
while no other alternatives were indicated as an advantage by more than 40% 
from this FC. However, the second most frequently listed advantages of TSA 
FC membership were income and management of part of the forest property 
without any requirement for personal involvement. Overall, a significantly larger 
proportion of respondent shareholders from Älvdalen and Jokkmokk perceived 
benefits from their FCs in different ways compared to those from the TSA (Table 
2). However, very few respondents recognized no advantages at all. These results 
indicate that public goods are the most important output in Älvdalen, while 
support for managing individuals’ forest properties is considered important in all 
three commons, but more so in TSA.
With regard to disadvantages perceived to be associated with FC membership, 
while about 73% of shareholders in Älvdalen perceive no disadvantages, 15% still 
note that it is difficult to get shareholders to pull in the same direction, 5% that the 
distance between management and shareholders is too large, and 4% report lack 
of control of their share as a negative factor. In Jokkmokk, 70% of respondents 
perceive no disadvantages from the FC, with 12% reporting the difficulty in 
getting the shareholders to act for a common goal a major disadvantage. TSA 
respondents, in contrast to the other two FCs, had a rather different view of their 
FC with 45% reporting difficulties in getting shareholders to act for a common 
goal as a major disadvantage, followed by 20% citing too little profit from the 
Table 1: Proportion of shareholders stating participation and use of their Forest Common (%). 
The percentage figures are rounded to the nearest integer
Participation/Benefits Älvdalen Jokkmokk TSA Total c2/p*
Fish and do outdoor recreation on FC 
land/water
67 70 47 61 18.99
<0.001
Receive cash payment from the FC 5 66 77 47 177.01
<0.001
Receive subsidies for activities on 
private property
64 80 1 46 193.28
<0.001
Hunt on the FC land 33 51 41 41 9.44
0.009
Take part in annual meetings/general 
assembly
35 43 19 31 18.75
<0.001
Participate in excursions, forest days 
and likewise
32 20 9 21 24.25
<0.001
Benefit indirectly from FCs’ support to 
sports clubs etc
42 12 1 19 86.44
<0.001
Get fuelwood from the FC 8 7 14 10 4.37
0.112
Participate as elected representative 3 6 6 5 1.66
0.435
Total cases (N) 153 115 145 413
*Pearson c2(2)/Bonferroni adjusted p-values; significant difference at p<0.05 in bold.
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FC, 16% citing lack of control on their share in the FC, and 15% stating too many 
shareholders as some of the major disadvantages of their FC. Only 32% of the 
respondents in TSA perceived no disadvantages from their FC. In addition, 13% 
of the TSA respondents perceived the rules, laws and by-laws related to their FC 
as a major disadvantage, while 9% thought there was too large a distance between 
the shareholders and the manager.
To relate these perceived advantages and disadvantages, including potential 
impacts on individual property, to those perceived regarding general contributions 
to development in the municipality, resident NIPF shareholders were asked about 
community-level benefits they associate with their FC. The results are presented 
in Table 3.
The responses indicate several differences between the three FCs (Table 3). 
The majority of respondents from Älvdalen (64%) and Jokkmokk (57%) associated 
their FC with contributions to the local economy; the figure was much lower in 
TSA (38%) – a statistically significant difference between the FCs (Table 3). Of the 
respondents from Älvdalen, 89% reported that the FC contributed to the roads. The 
Table 2: Perceived benefits from the FCs by individual shareholders. The figures represent 
the proportion (%) of affirmative response to specific benefits by the respondents (local 
shareholders). The table only includes perceived benefits with 20% or higher total response. 
The percentage figures are rounded to the nearest integer
Perceived benefits Älvdalen Jokkmokk TSA Total c2/p*
Provide spaces to hunt, fish, 
and other recreation
63 79 61 67 11.18
0.004
Provide roads 90 44 30 56 114.49
<0.001
Provide subsidies for 
managing private property
67 77 3 48 178.88
<0.001
Provide local employment 66 35 37 47 35.23
<0.001
FC revenue stay locally via 
local subsidies
80 41 11 45 140.60
<0.001
Support for public goods like 
clubs, roads, and schools
73 34 6 39 143.22
<0.001
Large-scale forestry 28 19 37 29 10.31
0.006
Help manage part of private 
property
29 14 39 28 19.44
<0.001
Monetary income 14 31 39 28 23.00
<0.001
Community cohesion and 
well-being
43 26 11 27 37.79
<0.001
Biodiversity conservation 32 20 8 20 25.15
<0.001
Total cases (N) 142 115 153 410
*Pearson c2(2)/Bonferroni adjusted p-values; significant difference at p<0.05 in bold.
174 Gun Lidestav et al.
figure is significantly lower for Jokkmokk and TSA at 45% and 31%, respectively. 
Similarly, significantly larger proportion of shareholders from Älvdalen associated 
their FC with promoting environmental and cultural values as well as overall well-
being locally compared to those from Jokkmokk and TSA (Table 3).
Finally, the respondent shareholders were also asked to indicate their opinions 
on various statements related to their FCs in order to gauge their overall view 
(Table 4). Corresponding with our findings presented above, the TSA shareholders 
seemed to have a less positive opinion of their FC since many stated that they 
found the statements only ‘partly true’ or ‘not true’, or that they did not have any 
opinion. Generally, the respondents from Älvdalen FC exhibited the highest level 
of agreement with the statements and respondents from TSA the lowest. Most 
shareholders in Älvdalen and Jokkmokk (85% and 83%, respectively) fully agreed 
with the last statement, “I am very content to be an FC shareholder”, compared 
to only about half of the shareholders in TSA (Table 4). However, only a small 
number of the TSA shareholders (7%) reject this statement as “not true”. Even for 
statements related to their individual/personal gains from their FCs, significantly 
larger proportion of respondent shareholders from Älvdalen and Jokkmokk had 
favourable response compared to those from the TSA (Table 4).
4.3. The dividend – its extent and use
By far the largest dividend per hectare among the three FCs was in Älvdalen 
FC during the entire period 1958–2007 (Figure 1). Älvdalen FC has three main 
Table 3: The perceived contribution of the FC to local community by the shareholders. 
The figures represent the proportion (%) of affirmative response to specific benefits by the 
respondents (local shareholders). The table only includes perceived benefits with 20% or higher 
total response. The percentage figures are rounded to the nearest integer
Perceived local contributions of FC Älvdalen Jokkmokk TSA Total c2/p*
Provides employment 78 52 47 60 31.85
<0.001
Brings roads 89 45 31 57 109.97
<0.001
Helps maintain traditional affiliation 
to local community
65 57 37 53 24.63
<0.001
Contributes to the local economy 64 50 38 51 20.28
<0.001
Special considerations to 
environmental and cultural values
40 21 15 26 25.70
<0.001
Special considerations to local  
well-being
38 25 12 25 25.79
<0.001
Considerations to other users  
(e.g. tourism)
20 29 19 22 4.18
0.124
Total cases (N) 152 110 139 401
*Pearson c2(2)/Bonferroni adjusted p-values; significant difference at p<0.05 in bold.
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income-generating streams: forestry, capital investments and hydroelectric energy 
production. The total amount distributed in Älvdalen increased considerably in the 
last decade. In contrast, the dividend per hectare in Jokkmokk and TSA has stayed 
more-or-less the same during the same period, with some decline after 1987.
The distribution system applied to the Älvdalen FC is such that the entire 
dividend stays within the municipality, either for common goods or to subsidise 
expenses incurred on the shareholders’ estates. In total, Älvdalen FC has distributed 
around 615 million SEK (based on 2006 prices, 1 SEK approx. 0.15 USD) over 
the last 50 years, of which 226 million SEK was distributed during the most 
recent decade. This corresponds to a contribution of 5053 SEK/year to common 
goods from each shareholder. In addition, the FC subsidizes the shareholders 
for activities on their estates amounting to, annualy on average, 7141 SEK per 
Table 4: Local shareholders’ opinions about their FC in Älvdalen, Jokkmokk and Tärna-
Stensele (TSA). Responses to the statements are: A=Totally agree; B=Partly agree; C=Do not 
agree; and D=Have no opinion. Figures across each response indicate the proportion (%) of 
respondents choosing that response, rounded to the nearest integer. ‘Cases’ shows the total 
number of respondents (N)
Statement Resp. Älvdalen Jokkmokk TSA Total c2/p*
FC contributes to more fair 
distribution of resources 
than individual ownership
A 61 46 25 45 36.55/<0.001
B 18 24 39 27 15.64/0.002
C 3 5 11 6 7.39/0.099
D 18 25 26 23 2.69/1.000
Cases 144 110 132 386
FC contributes to overall 
better use of natural 
resources than individual 
ownership
A 60 42 23 42 37.09/<0.001
B 20 30 36 27 8.66/0.053
C 2 9 9 6 6.81/0.133
D 18 18 32 23 9.36/0.037
Cases 142 109 129 380
FC has contributed to a 
positive development of my 
community
A 80 45 24 51 88.19/<0.001
B 14 39 35 28 23.09/<0.001
C 0 2 12 5 25.24/<0.001
D 6 15 29 17 27.01/<0.001
Cases 144 109 133 386
FC has contributed to my 
personal well-being
A 71 43 18 45 77.74/<0.001
B 18 35 36 29 13.98/0.004
C 1 4 15 6 25.71/<0.001
D 11 18 31 20 17.48/0.001
Cases 146 109 133 388
I am very pleased to be a 
FC shareholder
A 85 83 47 72 60.84/<0.001
B 7 11 33 17 39.39/<0.001
C 1 1 7 3 13.24/0.005
D 7 5 12 9 4.46/0.429
Cases 149 114 137 400
*Pearson c2(2)/Bonferroni adjusted p-values; significant difference at p<0.05 in bold.
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shareholder. Thus, for the last 10 years the FC has distributed, on average, 12 194 
SEK per shareholder annually, corresponding to 430 SEK/ha/year (Figure 1).
The second largest dividend was from Jokkmokk FC; during the last 50 
years the FC has distributed about 228 million SEK. For the last 10 years, the 
major shareholder, SCA, has received about 600 000 SEK annually and the 
NIPF shareholders 1.8 million SEK as general forest subsidy (equivalent to 2020 
SEK/NIPF-shareholder/year). In addition, 1.9 million SEK has been distributed 
annually as subsidies to the NIPF shareholders (2168 SEK/NIPF-shareholder/
year). Thus, for the last 10 years the FC has distributed, on average, 4188 SEK 
per NIPF shareholder per year, which corresponds to 70 SEK/ha/year (Figure 1). 
Leakage of profits out of the FC occurs mainly through the dividend distributed 
as general forest subsidy to non-resident shareholders, including all the money 
distributed to SCA (600 000 SEK/year), and about 50% of the sum distributed 
to NIPF shareholders as general forest subsidy (900 000 SEK/year), totalling 1.5 
million SEK annually.
The smallest dividend was from TSA, which during the last 50 years has 
distributed about 118 million SEK. The dividend for the last decade was the 
lowest of the whole period, on average, 1.3 million SEK/year. This is equivalent, 
on average, to 1015 SEK per shareholder per year, and corresponds to 34 SEK/
ha/year. The leakage amounts to about 39% of this, i.e. around 0.5 million SEK 
per year.
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Figure 1: Average dividend per year per hectare in the Älvdalen, Jokkmokk and Tärna-Stensele 
(TSA) FCs during the five 10-year periods between 1958 and 2007, converted to 2006 prices. 
1SEK= 0.15 USD.
Sources: Forest management reports and annual reports provided by each FC for the period 
1958–2007, except Jokkmokk in the period 1958–1967, for which the source was Liljenäs 
(1977).
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5. Discussion and conclusions
Despite the fact that the FCs were established in similar ecological and geographical 
environments, in order to fulfil the same aims, and having been subject to the 
same legal regulations since 1952, our results reveal that they have developed in 
different ways. There are differences in both perceptions of the benefits and costs 
from the FC by its membership, at an individual and at the community level, and 
in the actual size and use of the dividend. In general, most of the FC shareholders 
seem to be satisfied with their situation, but there are significant differences 
in how much advantage is perceived to result from FC membership between 
Älvdalen, Jokkmokk and TSA; shareholders in the latter seem to be the least 
satisfied. With regard to perceived benefits, shareholders from Älvdalen reported 
the highest level of FC support to local public goods while Jokkmokk shareholders 
emphasised individual gains. This seems to correlate with the priorities in each 
FC – which may be a result of management, reflecting members’ wishes, or of 
members having accepted particular types of outcomes of FC membership.
In terms of shareholders’ involvement in the management of their FCs, they 
elected the board responsible for day-to-day management with the professional 
forest manager and forest workers doing the actual work. However, our results 
reveal that very few shareholders actually attend the general assembly of the 
FCs – the figures ranging from about one-fifth to just under half of the respondents. 
Although lack of participation seems to be the general trend in the Swedish FCs 
(see for example, Nylund and Ingemarson 2007; Stenman 2009), it is interesting 
to note that TSA, with least satisfied shareholders as well as lowest dividend, also 
had the lowest participation rate. Although it is difficult to assess the causal link 
between participation (or lack thereof) and the level of benefits, we believe it to 
be dynamic and accentuating one another based on the shareholders’ responses 
in this FC. For example, almost half of the respondents in TSA cited difficulties 
in getting shareholders to act for a common goal as a major disadvantage; while 
about a fifth said lack of control in their own share in the FC and too little profit 
accruing from the FC as the major disadvantages of their FC. The latter two points 
may reflect a more state-regulated situation in the county of Västerbotten where 
TSA is located (cf. Holmgren et al. 2010), compared to Norrbotten and Dalarna. 
Nevertheless, these negative perceptions among the shareholders are likely to 
have a significant impact in their level of participation within the FC. On the other 
hand, although the participation in Älvdalen and Jokkmokk was still only under 
50%, it seems to be not related to similar sets of disadvantages as in TSA.
With regard to the dividend, Älvdalen FC yields the largest economic returns to 
the local shareholders, makes the highest contribution to common goods, and has 
the highest proportion of contented local shareholders. In contrast, the economic 
contribution is the lowest and the shareholders are the least contented with the 
TSA FC. Jokkmokk has an intermediate position in terms of both contentment 
and economic returns to NIPF shareholders. Thus, there is a positive correlation 
between the extent of economic output to shareholders and contentment. It also 
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seems that the amount of the dividend that is distributed to common goods is 
correlated to contentment. Partly, the differences in the size of dividend are due 
to additional income besides that from forestry, particularly from hydroelectric 
power stations, but also from capital investments. In addition (cf. Holmgren et 
al. 2004), the FCs in Dalarna generally have a higher mean site productivity and 
have been more active in their forestry operations. The cited study also found 
evidence of restrictive forestry practices in FCs in Norrbotten and, particularly, 
Västerbotten. Furthermore, the shareholders in TSA have been found to undertake 
fewer forestry activities in their individually managed forests (Holmgren et al. 
2007). One feature that differs between the FCs is the proportion owned by NIPFs. 
Hence, the forest companies may have influenced the intensity of forestry within 
them.
Despite the low dividend and low level of contentment, the number of 
shareholders has increased the most in TSA and the least in Älvdalen FC. This 
might seem contradictory, since the economic incentives to be a shareholder in 
Älvdalen FC are higher than in TSA. However, when the FC dividend, together 
with the income from private estates, becomes insignificant other ownership values 
may become more important. Such values could, for instance as data from TSA 
suggest (Table 2), include recreation, fishing and hunting, which are goods that 
shareholders gain access to regardless of the size of their share. Indeed, hunting, 
fishing and other recreational activities were both the stated and perceived primary 
benefits in all the FCs studied. In contrast, the perceived benefits from extractive 
forestry activities (for example, timber and fuelwood) were hardly mentioned. 
One of the major reasons for this is the fact that all forestry activities in the FCs are 
taken care of by professional foresters. However, this seems to create and widen 
the gap between the participation (and hence the input/cost) to the commons and 
the benefits (outputs) that the shareholders accrue from them; as Carlsson (1997) 
suggests, shareholders in the Swedish FCs seem to receive disproportionately 
higher benefits than their costs.
When we assess the performances of these three FCs in relation to some of the 
relevant attributes of successful commons (Ostrom 1990; McKean 1998) (see Box 
1), we find striking correlation between the economic performance (efficiency), 
and the perceived fairness (Box 1, #8) and general well-being from the FCs. 
Only a quarter of respondent shareholders in the TSA totally agreed that their FC 
contributed to a more fair distribution of resources, while the figure is close to half 
for Jokkmokk and three-quarters for Älvdalen. When we look at the economic 
performance of these FCs, Älvdalen provided the highest dividend per hectare 
and TSA the lowest, with Jokkmokk in between (Figure 1). This was the general 
trend in all the statements related to the shareholders’ views regarding their FCs 
(Table 4). Again, it is difficult to say which contributed to what – i.e. economic 
performance contributed to the shareholders’ views of fairness and well-being 
(or lack thereof) from the FCs and hence their involvement (or lack of active 
participation). Or, it could be that the decreasing level of active participation and 
interest in the management of their FCs, and in formulating the FCs plan of action 
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over the years has contributed to diminishing economic performance, especially 
in the FCs like TSA. In any case, one of the major attributes of the successful 
commons seems to be the (perceived) fairness both in the decision-making rights 
and in the accrual of benefits from the commons. In the case of TSA, we find this 
not to be the case.
In addition, the three FCs may have developed differently to some extent due 
to their early history and the settings in which the FCs were established. While 
Älvdalen FC was established in an old cultural setting, TSA was established under 
coercion and in an area where there has been little (if any) previous experience 
of traditional commons. Furthermore, the TSA FC was established by uniting 
the Tärna and Stensele FCs into a single common and by placing it in Stensele 
and giving the majority ownership to Tärna; it was, thus, created with an inbuilt 
tension something that has contributed to its less successful performance (cf. 
Ostrom 1990). The distribution principles applied by Älvdalen FC is such that 
the entire dividend stays within the municipality, either for common goods or to 
subsidize expenses incurred on the shareholders’ estates. In the case of TSA, in 
contrast, there has been the highest proportion of leakage out of the municipality, 
the smallest dividends, the lowest local contentment, and, it seems, people have 
lost much of their economic interest in the common. Nevertheless, we find that 
most Swedish forest commons have the attributes that are considered necessary 
for successful common property regimes, particularly in terms of their physical 
and institutional characteristics, such as clearly defined boundaries; membership 
criteria; and creation, modification and enforcement of rules, among others. 
Given that these commons have survived for over a century and continue to do so, 
many of them as successful commercial enterprise, demonstrates that many of the 
attributes associated with these Swedish FCs are certainly those of ‘long enduring 
commons’ (Ostrom 1990).
To conclude, this study highlights the significant differences in terms of actual 
economic performance as well as in perceived benefits from the Swedish forest 
commons that were established on the same institutional and legal framework, 
and are similar in terms of size, their site productivity and geographic location. 
We find that the FC with better economic performance also reflected the attributes 
usually associated with the successful commons, such as the perceived fairness 
in the distribution of benefits, and providing greater well-being to the individual 
shareholders as well as the community at large. In contrast, the FC with the worst 
economic performance was perceived to be less fair in its benefits distribution, 
and as a source of well being by its own shareholders. The major issue, however, 
seems to be the lack of active participation in the matters related to the FCs, 
for example in (annual) general assembly, where most of the management-
related issues are discussed and decisions made. On the one hand, shareholders, 
particularly in less well performing FC, seem to be complaining about the lack of 
control over their share in the FC (and hence lack of impact in its management), 
while at the same time they seem to be participating less in meetings where 
decisions about the FC are made. So, the challenge seems to be in reconciling 
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these contradictory positions of the shareholders – in their perceived fairness 
(or lack thereof) in benefits sharing and in decision-making within the FC, 
and in their participation (or more precisely their lack of participation). This 
is particularly important in the FCs with weak economic performance, such as 
TSA, where these might accentuate other inherent problems within the FC (for 
example, perceived lack of coordination among the shareholders), and take the 
FC to a downward spiral.
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